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PHYSICS WITHOUT PHYSIS: ON 
FORM AND TELEOLOGY IN 
MODERN SCIENCE
Simon oliv er
“[T]he metaphysical framework that rendered matter 
intelligible disintegrated and with it the notion of 
nature itself.”
Physics is often regarded as the most fundamental natural science. 
In its modern guise, it is concerned with matter, energy, and 
their interrelation over time and through space. Experimental 
physics deals with observations and measurements of the smallest 
and greatest dimensions of the universe. This blends with theo-
retical physics, which develops abstract mathematical models to 
explain experimental findings, proffering speculative possibili-
ties concerning the workings of physical systems. As experimen-
tal technologies develop, so the overlap between experimental 
and theoretical physics increases; previously abstract and specula-
tive models become empirically testable. While the possibility of 
reducing the other natural sciences to physics without remain-
der is now credible only among the most hardened of material-
ists, modern physics remains the quintessential science of nature 
(physis). It apparently delivers fundamental and comprehensive 
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knowledge of the cosmos, from the subatomic quantum realm to 
the furthest reaches of space and time.
The story of the rise of modern physics is long and 
complex: from the demise of Aristotelian natural philosophy in 
the late Middle Ages and its successive replacement by Galilean, 
Cartesian, and Newtonian physics, to the revolution inaugu-
rated in the twentieth century by special and general relativ-
ity, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory. One of the 
most striking aspects of this story is that, as physics apparently 
confined itself ever more exclusively to the study of an abstract 
matter and its behavior, thus yielding materialist ontologies, 
the nature of matter has become increasingly mysterious. It is 
almost as if matter has dissolved under the gaze of modern sci-
ence, which at the same time insists that matter is all that exists. 
As a consequence, it appears that physics’ grasp of the physis it 
purports to study—any sense of nature’s integrity, wholeness, 
and purpose, which we grasp intuitively—has become ever 
more tenuous.
The story of the increasingly mysterious nature of 
matter uncovered by modern physics is at once a story of ever 
greater abstraction, including abstraction from any metaphysi-
cal framework within which matter would be intelligible. For 
Aristotle, matter (hylē) was conceived within a delicately wo-
ven physics and metaphysics. Material natures were understood 
in relation to form within the wider category of substance and 
the fundamental metaphysical distinction between act and po-
tency. According to Aristotle, matter was a relative term that 
cannot be studied except under the aspect of the forms received 
by matter and within the context of the distinction between 
act and potency.1 For Newton, by contrast, matter or “body” 
was a quantity (mass) and a basic category derived from experi-
ence and subject to force. Matter was fundamental to the new 
mechanics.
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and 
force of inertia of the whole arise from the extension, 
hardness, impenetrability, mobility and force of inertia of 
each of the parts; and thus we conclude that every one of 
the least parts of all bodies is extended, hard, impenetrable, 
1. Aristotle, Physics II.2, 194b9.
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movable, and endowed with a force of inertia. And this is 
the foundation of all natural philosophy.2
Nevertheless, despite the stunning predictive and ex-
planatory success of the new natural philosophy, the problem of 
gravity and action at a distance presented significant challenges 
to Newton’s materialist mechanics. The transmission of gravi-
tational force suggested the existence of an ether between gross 
bodies through which that mechanical force could be transmit-
ted, yet its nature and status were mysterious and highly contest-
ed.3 Arguably, this remains true in contemporary physics with 
respect to the nature and status of fields.
It was not until the early decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury that more significant and decisive blows were dealt to classi-
cal Newtonian mechanics as an all-encompassing account of the 
physical world. In 1864, building on the earlier work of Michael 
Faraday and André-Marie Ampère, James Clerk Maxwell pre-
sented to the Royal Society of London his treatise A Dynamical 
Theory of the Electromagnetic Field, in which he united the fields of 
electricity and magnetism. He postulated that electricity, mag-
netism, and light are waves that move through space, much as 
a wave moves across the sea. Albert Einstein was later to claim 
that “the greatest change in the axiomatic basis of physics, and 
correspondingly in our conception of the structure of reality, 
since the foundation of theoretical physics through Newton, 
came through the researches of Faraday and Maxwell on electro-
magnetic phenomena.”4 This moved physics away from the study 
of matter per se toward the study of fields.5 At the same time, 
2. Isaac Newton, The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Phi-
losophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica [1726]), trans. I. B. Cohen and A. Whit-
man, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), bk. 3, 795–96.
3. For a brief account of Newton’s views of the ether, see Simon Oliver, 
Philosophy, God and Motion (London: Routledge, 2005), 175–77.
4. Albert Einstein, “Maxwell’s Influence on the Development of the Con-
ception of Physical Reality,” in James C. Maxwell, A Dynamical Theory of the 
Electromagnetic Field, ed. Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic 
Press, 1982), 29.
5. For an account of the development of field theories in physics, see Ernan 
McMullin, “The Origins of the Field Concept in Physics,” Physics in Perspective 
4 (2002): 13–39.
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a new science of “thermodynamics,” claiming to unify physics 
and chemistry, was proposed in the 1850s and 1860s by Wil-
liam Thompson and Peter Guthrie Tait. Their Treatise on Natural 
Philosophy of 1867 presented a science of the dynamics of energy 
(“energetics”) rather than the Newtonian dynamics of force; this 
drew physics further away from any simple notion of matter to-
ward energy as its primary focus of inquiry. Energy, rather than 
mere matter, was preserved through change. How energy related 
to matter was an open question, which received its first cogent 
answer in Einstein’s simple and emblematic equation E=mc2.6 
This was the basis of the special theory of relativity, which, refer-
ring to uniform motion, postulated that rest mass can be trans-
formed into kinetic or radiant energy, and vice versa. Mass was 
now understood as just one form of energy.
Einstein’s general theory of relativity, developed be-
tween 1907 and 1915 as an extension of special relativity, ac-
counted for gravity in terms of a warping of spacetime.7 Whereas 
Newton’s law of universal gravitation assumed that mass was the 
sole source of gravity, Einstein now proposed that, in addition 
to rest mass, other forms of energy were sources of gravitational 
agency. Even a body of zero mass—a photon, for example—ex-
erts a gravitational force due to its kinetic energy. According to 
general relativity, mass, energy (including potential energy), and 
momentum all serve as sources of gravity expressed mathemati-
cally as the stress-energy (or energy-momentum) tensor. This 
6. Einstein’s famous paper of 1905, “Ist die Trägheit eines Körpers von 
seinem Energieinhalt abhängig?” first published in Annalen der Physik, dem-
onstrates the equivalence of mass and energy. It is reproduced in translation 
as “Does the Inertia of a Body Depend upon Its Energy Content?” in A. Ein-
stein, H. A. Lorentz, H. Minkowski, and H. Weyl, The Principle of Relativity: A 
Collection of Original Memoirs on the Special and General Theory of Relativity, trans. 
W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffery (New York: Dover, 1952), 67–71. The particular 
reasoning of that paper has since been subject to criticism, and Einstein’s in-
debtedness to earlier work in thermodynamics is now well understood. Nev-
ertheless, the power, simplicity, and cultural significance of Einstein’s work is 
beyond doubt. See Max Jenner, Concepts of Mass in Contemporary Physics and 
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chap. 5.
7. Einstein’s development of general relativity culminated in the publica-
tion of his “The Field Equations of Gravitation” in November 1915. His paper 
“The Foundation of the Generalised Theory of Relativity” was published the 
following year and is available in Einstein et al., The Principle of Relativity, 
109–64.
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represented a remarkable transformation in physics and its pri-
mary object of inquiry, which could now be twofold: either the 
new single category of mass-energy, or simply rest mass (devoid 
of motion) and a separate category of energy. As Ernan McMul-
lin comments,
This is a startling demotion of matter as the sole carrier 
of the “reality” label. Something without mass is, by the 
Newtonian definition at least, something without any 
quantity of matter. Massless radiation would not, then, 
qualify as matter. The Einstein equivalence equation [of 
energy and mass] has, in effect, begun the “dematerializa-
tion” of physical reality. The only way in which the world 
can still be described as the “material” world, or the term 
materialism can preserve its original significance, is to re-
define “matter.” But how? Materialism, if one wants to re-
tain the term, seems to have unexpectedly become a much 
more open doctrine.8
It is certainly the case that the nature of materiality has 
been contested for centuries. The ambiguous nature of light, 
for example, was already apparent in the seventeenth century 
in the debate between Newton and Huygens concerning the 
corpuscular and wave theories. By the early twentieth century, 
it was clear that light had to be conceived as both a wave and 
a particle. Such ambiguity now belongs to matter in the sub-
atomic domain. The very high level of abstraction and the am-
biguous nature of phenomena treated by contemporary physics 
means that matter is not simply convertible with other forms of 
energy; it becomes a strangely amorphous concept in the world 
of subatomic quantum physics. The term “quantum” relates to 
the hypothesis that energy is parcelled into discrete “quanta,” 
a view proposed by Max Planck in 1900 to account for bod-
ies’ variable emittance of electromagnetic radiation. This new 
8. Ernan McMullin, “From Matter to Materialism. . . and [Almost] Back,” 
in Information and the Nature of Reality: From Physics to Metaphysics, eds. Paul 
Davies and Niels Henrik Gregersen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 24. For a further brief summary, see Philip Clayton, “Unresolved Di-
lemmas: The Concept of Matter in the History of Philosophy and in Con-
temporary Physics,” in Information and the Nature of Reality, 38–57; and Edward 
Feser, Aristotle’s Revenge: The Metaphysical Foundations of Physical and Biological 
Science (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid, Germany: Editiones Scholasticae, 2019), 
chap. 5.
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physics would present very unexpected but mathematically co-
herent phenomena.
One example of quantum strangeness arises from the 
superposition principle. Imagine a physical system that consists 
of just one subatomic particle, and two states of that system in 
which the particle is located first in region A and then in re-
gion B. Quantum physics stipulates that in a linear combination 
of these two states, the particle is mysteriously located in both 
regions. This does not mean that we cannot tell whether the 
particle is in region A or region B; its position really is inde-
terminate. It is possible to reproduce experimentally the linear 
combination of states in such a way that interference effects are 
observed that would not be present were the particle situated in 
either region A or region B. Therefore, the particle appears to be 
in both regions simultaneously. In a fashion similar to probabilis-
tic calculations relating to heat in thermodynamics, it is possible 
to calculate probabilities for the particle being in different posi-
tions. There is therefore a twofold mystery in quantum theory: 
first, the bilocation of particles that is unimaginable in a classical 
Newtonian view of the cosmos, and, second, a purely probabi-
listic nature, at least at a quantum level. In a situation where a 
particle bilocates in this way, however, its position may be fixed 
by experimental observation. The act of measuring sends the sys-
tem into a new state in which the location of the particle can be 
identified—the so-called “collapse of the wave function.” This is 
commonly known as the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
theory, which claims that a quantum system remains in a state 
of superposition until it is observed or interacts with something 
beyond that system.
Such strange phenomena appear to take place only at a 
subatomic level. Apparently, they do not impinge at the level 
of macroscopic nature. The famous thought experiment known 
as “Schrödinger’s Cat,” however, demonstrates how quan-
tum effects can, in theory, bear upon the macro physical level.9 
Schrödinger describes a cat confined to a steel chamber with a 
canister of hydrocyanic acid. The release of the gas will be trig-
gered via a Geiger counter, which contains a tiny piece of ra-
9. E. Schrödinger, “Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechan-
ik,” Naturwissenschaften 23 (1935): 807–12.
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dioactive material, one atom of which may or may not decay 
within the hour. If it decays and triggers the gas, the cat will be 
dead; if not, the cat will be alive. According to quantum theory, 
however, the radioactive nucleus of the material contained in the 
Geiger counter, which is unobserved, is in a superposition state; 
that is to say, as it decays one cannot be sure whether its location 
will be such as to trigger the release of the gas. Just as in the case 
of the bilocated particle above, it is in the act of measurement 
that the state of the system (whether the cat is dead or alive) is 
determined. The radioactive nucleus is in a superposition state 
and transfers this to a macro level by placing the cat in a similarly 
indeterminate state. The act of measurement then determines 
the state of the cat. However, what is more curious still is that, 
whatever one observes in the box, a cat that is alive or dead, it is 
not possible to provide a compelling reason why that particular 
state, rather than its alternative, pertains. Nature appears to be 
governed, even at a macro level, by probability.
In this thought experiment, Schrödinger intended to 
show that there was no coherent account of why a superposi-
tion could not transfer to macro-nature. Why do we not expe-
rience the superposition of macroscopic bodies? If photons, for 
example, can bilocate at the quantum level, it seems reasonable 
to suppose that bodies composed of photons should also bilocate. 
As the physicist Roger Penrose states, “Why, then, do we not 
experience macroscopic bodies, say cricket balls, or even people, 
having two completely different locations at once? This is a pro-
found question, and present-day quantum theory does not really 
provide us with an answer.”10 The relationship between these 
two worlds—the subatomic domain of quantum indeterminacy 
and the macroscopic domain of predictable certainty—is funda-
mentally unclear; our familiarity with the latter entails that the 
former appears strange and even paradoxical.
If contemporary physics is concerned with matter, the 
nature of its object of study is therefore mysterious and complex. 
Insofar as nature is understood in material terms, the grasp of 
nature by physics has become ever more tenuous. The ambigui-
10. Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind (Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 1989), 256. See also Wolfgang Smith, “From Schrödinger’s Cat to 
Thomistic Ontology,” The Thomist 63 (1999): 49–63.
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ties of matter—both its nature and behavior—lie at the root of 
today’s scientific inquiry. In fact, contemporary cosmology un-
derstands that less than five percent of the universe is composed 
of ordinary, baryonic matter. The remainder is composed of so-
called dark matter, which is detected only via its gravitational 
effect on galaxies, and dark energy, which repels gravity.
Against the background of the understanding of matter 
and nature in contemporary physics, in this article I will initially 
return to the premodern metaphysical framework that once sup-
ported natural philosophical inquiry in order to appreciate more 
clearly why modern science’s grasp of its own subject matter has 
become tenuous. This is not an arbitrary or nostalgic return to 
ancient thought because Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics was 
already an answer to the perceived inadequacies of the material-
ist atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. It will be seen that 
the metaphysical categories of act and potency, form and mat-
ter, along with the primacy of final causation, render matter and 
nature intelligible for Aristotle and his medieval commentators. 
While it is the case that the transition from the Aristotelian and 
Neoplatonic understanding of nature to the modern scientific 
worldview can be narrated in terms of the rise of mechanistic 
materialism and the rejection of purpose or final causes, it will 
be argued that the demise of formal causation and the primacy of 
wholes over parts lay at the root of this development. This meant 
that the metaphysical framework that rendered matter intelligible 
disintegrated and with it the notion of nature itself. The advent 
of quantum theory in the early twentieth century heralded a turn 
away from mechanism toward a more organic understanding of 
nature, which, despite the paradoxical and seemingly counter-
intuitive findings of contemporary physics and the increasingly 
problematic status of matter, suggests a clearer vision of nature’s 
unity and intelligibility, which in many ways revives the Aristo-
telian approach to natural philosophy.
This article will therefore proceed in three stages. First, 
the physics and metaphysics of form and finality in Aristotle and 
his principal medieval interpreter, Thomas Aquinas, will be ex-
amined in order to understand the context in which material na-
ture was understood prior to the advent of classical physics in the 
seventeenth century. Second, it will be argued that, in the ad-
vent of mechanistic physics in the seventeenth century, purpose 
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in nature remained an important aspect of natural philosophical 
explanation, but such purpose became increasingly unintelligible 
because of the demise of formal causal explanation. With this de-
mise came an increasingly abstract understanding of matter and 
the dissolution of the concept of nature understood as a series of 
wholes that constitute the subject matter of scientific enquiry. Fi-
nally, I will turn to contemporary physics and the interpretation 
of quantum theory, particularly David Bohm’s understanding of 
the implicate and explicate order of nature. It will be argued 
that Bohm understands nature as an organic whole in a more 
Aristotelian fashion in such a way that every part of nature is an 
expression of the whole and ordered toward that whole. This 
represents a return to the view that natural scientific inquiry is 
concerned with abstracted parts of nature that are only intel-
ligible in relation to the whole of which they are a part. Never-
theless, that whole is only finally understood metaphysically and 
theologically.
ARISTOTLE ON PHYSICS, METAPHYSICS, FORM, AND 
FINALITY
The fundamental metaphysical distinction that structures Aris-
totle’s physics is that between actuality (energeia) and potential-
ity (dunamis). This distinction applies to all finite being because 
everything, as subject to change (kinesis), is actually something 
(a child, for example) and potentially something else (an adult).11 
This distinction is the framework for Aristotle’s definition of 
motion, the category at the heart of his physics, which hovers 
between potency and act. Motion is the actualization of a po-
tency qua potency.12
11. Aristotle assumes this nuanced distinction throughout his Physics and 
Metaphysics. The most detailed treatment can be found in Metaphysics IX. See 
also Aristotle’s De Anima II.5, 417a21–b2.
12. Motion is “the actualization of what potentially is, as such; for example 
the actual progress of qualitative modification in any modifiable thing qua 
modifiable; the actual growing of a thing or shrinking . . . of anything capable 
of expanding or contracting; the process of coming into existence or passing 
out of it of that which is capable of so coming and passing; the actual moving 
of a physical body capable of changing its place” (Aristotle, Physics III.1, 201a). 
The English translation of Aristotle’s Physics throughout this essay are by P. H. 
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Paramount in Aristotle’s thought is the primacy of act 
over potency.13 It may be that potency precedes actuality in time; 
for example, the acorn, which is potentially an oak tree, comes 
chronologically prior to the oak tree. Actuality, however, is al-
ways prior to potentiality both in formula (logos) and substance, 
for potentiality is always a potential for an actuality that is on-
tologically prior. Act always “measures” potency, for potency is 
only understood in relation to act. Any motion (by which Ar-
istotle means any kind of change) requires something in act to 
reduce that which is in potency to act.14
Aristotle understands matter within this fundamental 
metaphysical context of act and potency. Matter itself, which Ar-
istotle calls “prime matter” (prōtē hulē) or “primary underlying 
thing” (prōton hupokeimenon),15 is a pure potency—not anything 
in particular—and is therefore strictly speaking unintelligible 
and not even existent. In being potential in itself, matter is al-
ways already actualized as a particular “something” through its 
form. Its first and absolute potential is therefore for the reception 
of form. Form is the “what it is to be” something; it is intrinsic to 
Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford and can be found in the Loeb Classical Library 
edition, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). On the inter-
pretation of Aristotle’s definition of motion as the actualization of a potency 
qua potency, see L. A. Kosman, “Aristotle’s Definition of Motion,” Phronesis 
14 (1969): 40–62; and Oliver, Philosophy, God and Motion, chap. 2. In order 
to avoid a circular or tautologous definition of motion, Aristotle stipulates 
that motion is the actualization of a potency as a potency. For example, if I am 
currently in London, I am equally potentially in Edinburgh and potentially 
in Cardiff. My motion to Edinburgh (rather than Cardiff ) on a train is the 
actualization of my potential to be in Edinburgh as a potential. When I arrive 
in Edinburgh, that potential is fully actualized. By defining motion as the 
actualization of a potency as a potency, Aristotle captures motion’s intermedi-
ate status between potency and act while not resorting to a tautology such as 
“motion is passage from potency to act.”
13. Aristotle, Metaphysics IX.8, 1049b4–15. See also Thomas Aquinas, 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame: 
Dumb Ox Books, 1995), 611 (IX.7, 1846). All references to Aquinas’s Com-
mentary are from this edition.
14. Strong echoes of the distinction between act and potency remain in the 
notion of potential energy in modern physics. See Thomas McLaughlin, “Act, 
Potency, and Energy,” The Thomist 75 (2011): 207–43.
15. See, for example, Physics I.9, 192a31; Physics II.1, 193a10; Metaphysics 
V.4, 1014b32; V.6, 1017a5–6. Metaphysics VII.3, 1029a20–30, although not 
featuring the phrase “prime matter,” is particularly instructive.
SIMON OLIVER452
something’s nature and defines that nature.16 Indeed, the forms of 
things are closely allied to nature, which is “the distinctive form 
or quality of such things as have within themselves a principle of 
motion, such form or characteristic property not being separable 
from the things themselves, save conceptually.”17 The intrinsic 
principle of motion in nature allows Aristotle to distinguish na-
ture from art and to claim that art always imitates nature; art has 
an extrinsic principle of motion in the maker or operator. Fur-
thermore, this allows Aristotle to identify where the attention of 
the physicist must lie.
How far then, is the physicist [phusikon] concerned with 
the form and identifying essence of things and how far with 
their material? With the form primarily and essentially, 
as the physician is with health; with the material up to 
a certain point, as the physician is with sinew and the 
smith with bronze. For his main concern is with the 
goal, which is formal; but he deals only with such forms 
as are conceptually, but not factually, detachable from the 
material in which they occur.18
This passage gestures toward the fundamental link be-
tween the formal and final cause in Aristotle’s physics and meta-
physics: form is the final cause.19 Every dynamic substantial form 
is defined fundamentally by the goal toward which it strives. 
The mode of final causation, the “cause for the sake of which,” 
is fundamental for Aristotle because without a goal or purpose 
there would be no intelligible agency in nature.20 Among the 
16. Physics II.1, 193a28–35: “This then is one way of regarding ‘nature’—as 
the ultimately underlying material of all things that have in themselves the 
principle of movement and change. But from another point of view we may 
think of the nature of a thing as residing rather in its form, that is to say the 
‘kind’ of thing it is by definition.”
17. Physics II.1, 193b.3–6.
18. Ibid., II.2, 194b.10–14.
19. Ibid., II.8, 199a33.
20. Ibid., II.3, 194b.30. For Aquinas on agency and final causation, see 
Summa theologiae I-II, q. 1, a. 2 co (hereafter cited as ST ): “Every agent, of ne-
cessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, 
the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the 
first of all causes is the final cause.”
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four modes into which cause falls (efficient, material, formal, and 
final), the final cause is the most fundamental in natural philo-
sophical explanation because it answers the “why” question and 
gives an account of natural agency. All other modes of causation 
are derivable from the final cause. As Aquinas put it, “Whence it 
is said that the end is the cause of causes, because it is the cause of 
the causality in all the causes.”21
In his discussion of final causation, Aristotle makes an 
important distinction between the goal as the aim of an ac-
tion (“that of which”) and the goal as the beneficiary (“that for 
which”).22 For example, the aim of the art of medicine is health 
(“that of which”), whereas the beneficiary of the art of medicine 
is the patient (“that for which”). A physician has health as the 
goal of her art; at the same time, there is a beneficiary in the form 
of the patient whose health is restored. This distinction is impor-
tant for Aristotle in a number of respects. For example, it can be 
seen that the first unmoved mover is the end of motion not in the 
sense of being a beneficiary (because, in being fully actual, the 
first unmoved mover cannot benefit from anything), but in the 
sense of being the aim or focus of desire. I will return shortly to 
Aristotle’s distinction between the final cause as aim and the final 
cause as beneficiary.
The priority of act over potency helps to answer a very 
common charge made against final causation, namely that it in-
volves mysterious backwards causation. This criticism reveals the 
extent to which efficient causation dominates our contemporary 
understanding. Take the example of an acorn growing toward 
the goal of being an oak tree. That oak tree, yet to be realized 
from the acorn, causes the acorn to grow. On one interpreta-
tion, there is some kind of causal “pull” exerted by these goals 
or aims, in this case the oak tree. But how could a tree that does 
not yet exist cause this acorn to grow in the here and now? Yet 
this is to treat the final cause as if it were some kind of efficient 
21. Thomas Aquinas, De principiis naturae, ed. and trans. Joseph Bobik, 
Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A Translation and Interpretation of the 
De Principiis Naturae and the De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aqui-
nas (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998), 60 (chap. 4, §22).
22. De Anima II.4, 415b1–7. See also Physics II.2, 194a35–b3; Metaphysics 
XII.7, 1072b2–6.
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cause pulling the acorn toward becoming an oak. The key is to 
recognize that final causes are prior in nature and definition, but 
are in some senses last in the order of generation or time. In the 
case of the acorn, the final cause (being an oak tree) must come 
first in the order of explanation and intelligibility, like actuality 
itself. In the temporal order or the order of generation, the final 
cause, like actuality that results from the realization of a potency, 
comes last because it is the outcome of the development of the 
acorn into the oak. This is even clearer in the case of human in-
tentional action: I decide that I want to get fit, so I go running, 
the result of which is my fitness. In the order of explanation or 
intelligibility with respect to the final cause, I must start with the 
identification of the goal of getting fit, which is the final cause of 
me running; running is, in turn, the efficient cause of me get-
ting fit. The order of explanation begins with the final cause and 
ends with the result. In the order of generation or time, the goal 
comes last. Aristotle never claimed that the final cause mysteri-
ously acts as an efficient cause by exerting some kind of “pull” 
toward the goal. Neither did he regard the formal cause to be a 
mysterious “pushing” efficient cause within the creature. The 
blending of formal, final, efficient, and material causes, with the 
final cause as primary and fundamental, helps to create explana-
tory adequacy. This is why Aristotle and Aquinas regard final 
causes as so fundamental: they come first in the order of explana-
tion and intelligibility, for the telos “is the cause of the causality 
in all the causes.”
According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, the formal and 
final modes of causation account for the fundamental structure 
of nature as the object of natural philosophical inquiry. In Meta-
physics 5, Aristotle discusses the various modes of causation and 
Aquinas, in his commentary, delineates the different levels of 
formal unity in material substances.23 First, there is form, which 
is simply the shape given to material, as for example silver that is 
fashioned into a goblet. Second, there is the form of something, 
which arises merely from the proximate arrangement of parts, 
as for example the soldiers in an army or the houses in a city. 
Third, there is the form, which comes from the arrangement of 
23. Metaphysics V.2, 1013b16–1014a25; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, 287 (V.3, 779).
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parts and their extrinsic bonding. An example would be a house 
whereby the composition of bricks bonded by mortar has the 
role of a form. Finally, there is the more fundamental unity that 
belongs to a compound (mixtione) whereby the component parts 
themselves are “re-formed” into a new unity with a singular 
dynamic substantial form that possesses an intrinsic principle of 
motion toward an end. These different levels of formal causation 
allow Aristotle to identify where nature, as opposed to artifice, 
is to be found: it lies within that fundamental substantial unity 
that possesses a singular form—an irreducible whole—that fea-
tures an intrinsic principle of motion.24 The crucial point in Ar-
istotle’s metaphysical scheme, however, concerns priority in the 
order of explanation and the order of the real. The unity of form 
may come sequentially last in time, but it is first in “formula and 
substance,” for it realizes the material as a substantial and therefore 
intelligible unity. Both Aristotle and Aquinas locate nature in the 
intelligible unity of form instantiated in matter. Meanwhile, the 
material elements in any dynamic substantial unity are intrinsi-
cally related to each other in the sense that what affects one af-
fects the others. This is the subject matter of the natural philoso-
phy we call physics.
The form, however, is at once the final cause. Aristotle’s 
conception of nature studied by the physicist is fundamentally 
teleological. The final good of every natural substance is its full 
actuality and perfection, and therefore its good.25 Its potency is 
intelligible in relation to the actuality of its goal. In Metaphysics 
12, Aristotle discusses the nature of the good and whether that 
good is something separated, or whether it is immanent within 
the order of things: “We must also consider in which sense the 
nature of the universe contains the good or the supreme good; 
whether as something separate and independent, or as the orderly 
arrangement of its parts.”26 He uses the example of an army. Does 
its good lie in the ordered relation of the soldiers, or in the gen-
eral who stands above them, or in both? Aristotle concludes that 
the good lies in both, but more in the general because “he is not 
24. Metaphysics V.4, 1015a14–19.
25. Ibid., V.2, 1013b25–29.
26. Ibid., XII.10, 1075a12–15.
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due to the order, but the order is due to him.”27 In any order, Ar-
istotle concludes that all things are jointly ordered with respect to 
one thing in which they all share or participate. For some inter-
preters, this implies that the good is immanent in the individual 
members of any order simply by virtue of what they are. Howev-
er, Aristotle wants to point out that all individuals work toward 
a good that transcends their individuality and constitutes a good 
for the whole. This is certainly the case in Aristotle’s politics, in 
which an individual realizes his good by realizing the good of the 
city, which exists for the good life. More importantly, it should 
be remembered that Aristotle does not think in terms of separat-
ed and discrete systems in either politics or nature. So, we might 
say that any given order composed of individuals (the metaphor 
of an army regiment) will itself be part of a wider order (the 
metaphor of a nation’s army) and work for its own good, which 
is constituted also by the good of the whole. For any given order, 
there is yet another good that transcends that particular order. 
Aristotle can therefore state in the De Anima that “every creature 
strives for this [the divine], and for the sake of this performs all 
its natural functions.”28
Aristotle’s teleological physics and metaphysics, centered 
fundamentally on formal and final causes, is framed theologi-
cally by reference to an ultimate or last end. A purely natural-
ized teleology—a pattern of finite ends, every one of which is 
intermediate and pertains to a further end—leads to an infinite 
regress that would be explanatorily incomplete with respect to 
the agency and order in nature that are the very basis of there be-
ing natural scientific inquiry. Aristotle’s distinction between the 
final cause as the aim of an action (for example, health as the goal 
of medicine) and the final cause as the beneficiary (the patient 
whose health is restored) is important in this regard. Precisely in 
striving for the final cause as the aim of an action, every creature 
at the same time is the beneficiary as it fulfils its nature. A sepa-
rate (kechōrismenon) and transcendent final cause is required for 
explanatory completeness—that which is the end of all ends, as 
27. Ibid., XII.10, 1075a17–18.
28. De Anima II.4, 415b1–2.
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having no end beyond itself because of its eternal aseity.29 Thus 
the primacy of the mover that is itself unmoved as the ultimate 
framework for the intelligibility of matter, form, and the modes 
of causation studied by physics, is an aspect of the explanatory 
principle that act precedes and measures potency.
Aristotle therefore understands the final cause to be both 
transcendent in the ultimate good and final end of all things, and 
intrinsic in the orientation of natures to a participation in that 
final end through their own perfection. The Aristotelian account 
of teleology therefore avoids a critical dualism that besets many 
modern discussions, namely that between intrinsic and extrinsic 
teleology. As we will see, the understanding of final causation in 
early modern physics tended to assume that matter is passive and 
inert in such a way that any orientation to a final end is extrinsic 
to a material entity after the manner of an artifact. This tended 
to reverse the traditional principle that art imitates nature; for 
the physico-theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, nature was understood to be akin to an artifact such as 
a machine. Meanwhile, attempts have been made to defend a 
purely naturalized teleology that avoids any need for a transcen-
dent principle of goodness or being.30
I now turn to the advent of modern physics and its more 
exclusive focus on efficient causation to the exclusion of form and 
finality. The absence of a thoroughgoing and intelligible meta-
physics of the natural meant that physics was unable to maintain 
a grasp of the object of its study.
29. Aquinas makes this particularly clear with respect to human intentional 
agency and man’s last end. Nevertheless, such desire for the supernatural is part 
of nature’s desire for the good in itself, namely God. See Aquinas, ST I-II, q. 1, 
a. 6 co: “Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last 
end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he 
desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, 
which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect 
good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its comple-
tion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every 
beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved 
through the last end.”
30. For a nonmaterialist but naturalist account of teleology, see Thomas 
Nagel, Mind in Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature 
Is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
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FROM FORM AND FINALITY TO MECHANISM AND 
MATERIALISM
It is very common to narrate the rise of modern natural philoso-
phy from the sixteenth century in terms of the demise of the an-
cient and medieval teleological cosmos and its replacement by a 
purposeless mechanistic cosmos. Final causes were apparently re-
garded as unnecessary for the proper explanation of natural phe-
nomena. Francis Bacon, the Elizabethan father of the scientific 
method, claimed that final causes might be useful in the explana-
tion of goal-orientated human intentional actions, but are oth-
erwise barren.31 Wider nature, however, is to be explained not 
by final causes but by efficient causes, now understood as those 
events that immediately precede an effect in time and transmit 
their causal power via physical contact. Moreover, even human 
intentionality would come to be understood as reducible to ma-
terial efficient causes, at least in principle.
According to the new mechanistic science, phenomena 
could be described with reference to a single level of the mate-
rial universe known as micro-corpuscles.32 These tiny bodies were 
thought to act on one another to transmit a mechanical quantity 
of motion via physical contact. This meant that natural processes 
were now understood as the transmission of force rather than, as 
with Aristotle and his medieval commentators, the communica-
tion of form. The macroscopic world that we experience was un-
derstood as merely an assemblage of micro-corpuscles. Just as one 
could explain the working of a machine by reducing it to the in-
teractions of its moving parts, so one could explain the working of 
an organism by reducing it to its micro-corpuscles and their action 
upon each other. Within a mechanistic cosmos, there are appar-
ently no purposes or goals as such; everything can be explained in 
terms of the blind mechanical actions of material elements upon 
one another. Those actions could be identified by the new physics 
through observation and mathematical explanation.
31. See Francis Bacon, The New Organon, eds. Lisa Jardine and Michael 
Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), bk. 2, apho-
rism 2, 102.
32. See Stephen Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensi-
bility: Science and the Shaping of Modernity 1680–1760 (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010), 58–64.
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Nevertheless, a certain account of final causes or purpose 
remained in seventeenth and eighteenth-century physico-theol-
ogy. This was largely because blind mechanism or natural neces-
sity were thought to lead ineluctably to atheism. In 1688, Robert 
Boyle published his A Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural 
Things, in which he argued that the task of the new philosophy 
of nature was to inquire into the purposes of things, understood 
as their utility for humanity. Revealing such purposes would lead 
to greater piety and gratitude toward God, the maker of crea-
tures. In his Boyle lectures of 1702, published as A Demonstration 
of the Being and Attributes of God, Samuel Clarke, the principal 
spokesman for Newtonianism against continental Cartesianism 
and Spinozism in the early eighteenth century, defended a teleo-
logical view of nature that was extrinsic and grounded in the free 
and inscrutable will of God. Of matter, Clarke wrote,
A tendency to move some one determinate way cannot be 
essential to any particle of matter, but must arise from some 
external cause because there is nothing in the pretended 
necessary nature of any particle to determine its motion 
necessarily and essentially one way rather than another. 
And a tendency or conatus equally to move every way at 
once is either an absolute contradiction, or at least could 
produce nothing in matter but an eternal rest of all and 
every one of its parts.33
For Clarke, there was nothing akin to form or intrinsic 
teleological order in matter. Those things that we often attribute 
to the natural powers of matter or the laws of motion are simply 
the effects of God acting on matter immediately, or mediately via 
created intelligences. Because the metaphysics of causation had 
been flattened and the traditional distinction between primary 
and secondary causes abandoned under the weight of a univocal 
doctrine of God, divine causes and created causes were now in 
competition. The premodern view was that God, in being the 
primary cause and ultimate end of all things, was the very basis 
of there being real and intelligible causes in nature.34 As the ulti-
33. Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and 
Other Writings, ed. Ezio Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), sec. 3, 19.
34. See Simon Oliver, Creation: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Blooms-
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mate final cause, God was understood as “the cause of the causal-
ity in all the causes.”35 By the sixteenth century, divine causation 
was conceived as univocal with creaturely causation in such a 
way that God and creatures were thought to act on the same 
causal plane. In order to preserve the omnipotence and freedom 
of God, matter was understood to be merely passive. “Nature” 
was evacuated of all content except the quality of being acted 
upon by God. Clarke writes,
Consequently, there is no such thing as what men commonly 
call “the course of nature” or “the power of nature.” The 
course of nature, truly and properly speaking, is nothing else 
but the will of God producing certain effects in a continued, 
regular, constant, and uniform manner; which course or 
manner of acting, being in every moment perfectly arbitrary, 
is as easy to be altered at any time as to be preserved.36
The consequence of this understanding of matter, final 
causes and nature, and the impoverished metaphysics that sur-
rounded it, were deeply significant in the development of West-
ern science. The historian of science Jessica Riskin has recently 
pointed to one striking effect of the banishment of agency from 
nature. She is particularly concerned with the rhetoric of con-
temporary biology under the continued influence of early mod-
ern physics. On the one hand, biology deals with life and there-
fore agency. Biologists find it very difficult, if not impossible, 
to banish the concept of purpose from their discourse. It is hard 
to give an account of the immune system, for example, without 
pointing to the goal of health. On the other hand, biology is 
under pressure from the allegedly more fundamental sciences of 
physics and chemistry to banish agency from nature and account 
for life in terms of interactions between the material components 
of a mechanism. So Riskin writes,
I think that biologists’ figures of speech reflect a deeply 
hidden yet abiding quandary created by the seventeenth-
bury, 2017), 75–80.
35. See note 21 above.
36. Clarke, “From a Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations 
of Natural Religion,” in A Demonstration of the Being, 149.
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century banishment of agency from nature: do the order 
and action in the natural world originate inside or outside? 
Either answer raises big problems. Saying “inside” violates 
the ban on ascriptions of agency to natural phenomena such 
as cells or molecules, and so risks sounding mystical and 
magical. Saying “outside” assumes a supernatural source of 
nature’s order, and so violates another scientific principle, 
the principle of naturalism.37
Riskin points precisely to the problem of intrinsic and 
extrinsic teleology considered earlier in this article. If the order 
and teleology of nature is intrinsic, we have to say that enti-
ties such as molecules and organisms are not simply mechanisms; 
they are agents whose agency emerges from within and expresses 
what they are. To account for such agency, we would need an 
account of causation that is far more comprehensive than simple 
mechanistic efficient causes. On the other hand, if the order and 
teleology of nature is extrinsic to nature, it must be ascribed to a 
supernatural agent such as God. Then we return to a divine de-
signer, an idea that is roundly rejected by contemporary science 
as inimical to a discipline that must refer only to natural causes.
A further consequence of the demise of formal and final 
causation was the fragmentation of natural philosophy itself, par-
ticularly the area of inquiry that is broadly associated with phys-
ics. The mechanistic theory that accompanied the corpuscular 
theory of matter was questioned early in the eighteenth century 
because some phenomena, particularly gravity and action at a 
distance, did not easily submit to this mode of explanation. In the 
work of figures such as Leibniz, an attempt was made to enrich 
the corpuscular theory of matter with a new metaphysics in order 
to give a more complete explanation of natural phenomena.38 
Meanwhile, as Stephen Gaukroger points out, disciplines that 
examined the physical features of things (those concerned with 
matter theory) such as electricity, chemistry, physiology, and 
pneumatics, had no necessary or substantial connection with one 
37. Jessica Riskin, The Restless Clock: A History of the Centuries-Long Argu-
ment over What Makes Living Things Tick (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2016), 6.
38. Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism, 330–31.
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another.39 There was no unifying conception of matter nor an 
overarching metaphysical framework within which nature might 
be conceived as whole and intelligible. In particular, Gaukroger 
points to the difficulties exemplified in Newton’s Opticks of 1704, 
which indicate the problems raised by the behavior of matter: Is 
it particulate or fluid? Most pressingly, was gravity due to a cor-
puscular or a fluid ether?40 Newton himself maintained a strict 
corpuscular theory of matter in the famous “31st Query” in the 
4th edition of the Opticks (1730), but the ability of that theory to 
account for the full range of natural phenomena, including the 
behavior of light, was widely called into question.41
As Riskin and Gaukroger demonstrate, the corpuscular 
theory of matter and the mechanistic understanding of nature 
established a new but problematic understanding of the priority 
of natural philosophy. For Aristotle, living things, particularly 
the unity and wholeness of the organism, were understood as 
the principal focus of natural philosophical inquiry in relation 
to which all matter had to be understood. Generation and cor-
ruption of life were paradigms of change, and the overarching 
metaphysical framework for this inquiry was formal and final 
causation. By the eighteenth century, this priority had been re-
versed in such a way that living things had to be understood in 
terms of biomechanics and the physics of nonliving corpuscu-
lar matter. As mechanism came under critical scrutiny in the 
eighteenth century, its ability to account for life was regarded as 
deeply compromised. Matter was now understood as fluid living 
matter or dry dead matter.42 What had been lost to early modern 
39. Ibid., 329.
40. Ibid., 331.
41. Isaac Newton, Opticks (New York: Dover Publications, 1979), bk. 3.1, 
query 31, 389: “All Bodies seem to be composed of hard Particles: For other-
wise Fluids would not congeal; as Water, Oils, Vinegar, and Spirit or Oil of 
Vitriol do by freezing. . . . Even the Rays of Light seem to be hard Bodies; for 
otherwise they would not retain different Properties in their different Sides. 
And therefore Hardness may be reckon’d the Property of all uncompounded 
Matter. At least, this seems as evident as the universal Impenetrability of Mat-
ter.”
42. Gaukroger, The Collapse of Mechanism, 332: “On this conception, what 
the mechanists had in effect concerned themselves with was dead matter, but, 
it was now argued, dead matter, far from being the paradigm form of matter, 
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physics was any sense of the intrinsic dynamism of matter that 
could help to explain the more critical aspects of nature such as 
life, or, indeed, to give an intelligible understanding of nature as 
anything more than an assemblage of bits of matter lacking in-
trinsic significance and value. The simple intuition of the critics 
of reductive, corpuscular physics was that parts were to be un-
derstood in terms of wholes and not vice versa, which is another 
way of saying that act has priority over potency. This is paradig-
matically the case with the unity of the living organism to which 
physics seems explanatorily inadequate.
The nature and task of physics has since developed dra-
matically, particularly through the twentieth century. The cor-
puscular materialism has long given way to a different conception 
of energy and matter that is fundamentally dynamic. We now 
turn to examine twentieth-century physics and the turn from 
mechanism to a new conception of the wholeness of nature that 
hints at the possibility of a return of formal and final causation.
CONTEMPORARY PHYSICS AND THE WHOLENESS OF 
NATURE
A central feature of the mechanistic cosmology of early modern 
physics is the external relation of corpuscular matter. The mate-
rial elements of the universe are understood not only as separate 
in space; their fundamental natures are also independent. Their 
interaction is only via the transmission of force. They are un-
derstood to relate externally to one another through structural 
arrangement, but there is no organic growth into a whole that 
is more than the assemblage of parts. Any teleological structure 
could therefore only be extrinsic, akin to that of a machine whose 
parts are not intrinsically or “naturally” ordered to one another. 
By contrast, in the growth of an organism, which in Aristote-
lian terms acquires a new formal unity, changes in one part can 
profoundly affect the other parts because they are internally or 
intrinsically related. The advent of relativity and quantum phys-
ics overturned the extrinsic and mechanical relation of material 
was simply matter that had lost the interesting dynamic properties of living 
matter and—it was argued by some—it was this latter that was the proper sub-
ject of matter theory and natural philosophy more generally.”
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elements and gave an account of the intrinsic relation of material 
substances, for example in the phenomenon known as “entangle-
ment.” In turn, this has given rise to different articulations of the 
wholeness of nature, for example in the work of David Bohm 
and Bernard d’Espagnat.43 Bohm’s notion of the implicate order 
of nature will be our principal focus.
Bohm identifies key areas in which quantum theory 
challenges mechanistic physics at a more profound level than 
general relativity.44 First, movement is discontinuous because it 
is parcelled into discrete and indivisible quanta. This means that 
an electron, for example, can go from one state or position to 
another without passing through any intermediate states or posi-
tions. The implication of this cosmology is that every part of the 
universe, whether it be particle or wave, is connected to every 
other part at the indivisible quantum level. Second, all matter 
and energy have a dual nature as both wave and particle, de-
pending on the environmental conditions such as the observing 
apparatus. This suggests that matter and energy have an intrinsic 
or organic relation to the surrounding conditions—the whole, as 
it were—of which they are a part. Third, there is a nonlocal con-
nection between particles or other elements such as fields. This 
is an important aspect of quantum theory that features heavily 
in Bohm’s understanding of the implicate order of nature; it has 
its origins in a paper by Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan 
Rosen, which resulted in what became known as the EPR ef-
fect.45 Imagine two particles, A and B, are located together and 
have spin such that their total spin is zero. Spin is a vector quan-
tity having magnitude and direction. According to quantum me-
43. Bernard d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006); and David Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order 
(London: Routledge Classics, 2002). D’Espagnat’s neo-Kantian approach, 
which postulates a “veiled reality” lying behind the scientific encounter with 
nature, has proved influential but very controversial among philosophers of 
science. See d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, esp. 236–45.
44. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 222. For an excellent summary, 
see Bohm, “The Implicate Order: A New Approach to the Nature of Reality,” 
in Beyond Mechanism: The Universe in Physics and Recent Catholic Thought, ed. 
David L. Schindler (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), 13–37.
45. Albert Einstein et al., “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Phys-
ical Reality Be Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47 (1935): 777–80.
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chanics, one cannot determine all aspects of the spin of particle 
A without that measurement affecting particle B, even if they 
are moving apart at the speed of light and therefore not locally 
connected. The two particles are “entangled” in the sense that, 
having been locally associated but now separate, what happens to 
particle A affects particle B. This thought experiment remained 
empirically unverified until a paper by John Bell in the 1960s 
showed the nonlocal nature of quantum mechanics (the famous 
“Bell Inequalities”), which, in turn, led to experiments in the 
1980s undertaken by Alan Aspect that confirmed Bell’s theo-
rem.46 Quantum entities remain mutually entangled, regardless 
of the spatial distance between them.
The interpretation of phenomena such as entanglement 
and nonlocal causality is still a matter of considerable debate. Ac-
cording to Bohm, this aspect of quantum physics implies an im-
plicate order to the universe that binds every part into a whole. 
He uses two striking examples to describe that order and distin-
guish it from the order conceived in a mechanistic cosmology.47 
The first, the lens, was central to the development of modern sci-
ence in instruments such as the telescope and microscope. Imag-
ine an object that forms an image through a lens, for example a 
camera that projects an image onto film. A given point on the 
object corresponds exactly to a given point on the image. This 
implies a correspondence between object and image, but also 
the divisible nature of both into component parts that are ex-
trinsically related. The lens, which is able to deliver images of 
things too small, too far away, too fast, or too slow to see with 
the naked eye, supports the idea that our knowledge is similarly 
a mechanical representation of reality that is merely the compo-
sition of parts.48 Our knowledge of nature becomes simply the 
assemblage of our knowledge of the bits of nature. In addition to 
46. John Bell, “On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox,” Physics 1, no. 
3 (1964): 195–200.
47. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 182–97.
48. The history of knowledge as representation, implying that our knowl-
edge is not of the world but of an image of the world, extends at least as far 
back as John Duns Scotus. See Olivier Boulnois, Être et représentation: Une 
généalogie de la métaphysique moderne à l’époque de Duns Scot (XIIIe–XIVe siècle) 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999).
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the lens, Bohm offers a second means of thinking about natural 
order: the hologram. A hologram is a recording of a light field 
created by the interference pattern of a split laser beam. A laser 
is split, and one beam illuminates an object that is reflected onto 
a photographic plate, while the other beam is aimed directly at 
the plate. The recorded image created on the plate appears three 
dimensional. Two aspects of the holographic image particularly 
interest Bohm. First, there is not a direct one-to-one correspon-
dence between a point on the illuminated object and a point on 
the image. The image is therefore not an identical “mechanical” 
repetition of the object. Second, and most importantly, if the 
holographic film is cut into pieces, each piece will have an image 
of the whole object. It is as if the whole object is enfolded into 
every part of the image. There is an indivisible implicate order. 
This leads Bohm to suggest that the universe is akin to a giant 
hologram that is subject to what he calls holomovement. The 
whole universe is somehow enfolded into, or implicated in, every 
part. Bohm writes,
There is the germ of a new notion of order here. This 
order is not to be understood solely in terms of a regular 
arrangement of objects (e.g., in rows) or as a regular 
arrangement of events (e.g., in a series). Rather, a total 
order is contained, in some implicit sense, in each region 
of space and time. Now, the word “implicit” is based on 
the verb “to implicate.” This means “to fold inward.” . . . 
So we may be led to explore the notion that in some sense 
each region contains a total structure “enfolded” within 
it.49
The notion that the whole of nature is enfolded in every 
part of nature points away from mechanism toward an organic 
understanding of nature as a whole from which parts are derived. 
This leads Bohm to a different understanding of natural science 
that is more akin to Aristotelian natural philosophy than early 
modern physico-theology.
In the prevailing mechanistic approach . . . these elements 
[e.g., fields and particles] are taken as constituting the basic 
reality. The task of science is then to start from such parts and 
49. Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order, 188.
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to derive all wholes through abstraction, explaining them 
as the results of interactions of the parts. On the contrary, 
when one works in terms of the implicate order, one begins 
with the undivided wholeness of the universe, and the task 
of science is to derive the parts through abstraction from the 
whole, explaining them as approximately separable, stable 
and recurrent, but externally related elements making up 
the relatively autonomous sub-totalities, which are to be 
described in terms of an explicate order.50
Bohm describes an order of understanding that is much 
more akin to the Aristotelian method focused on the priority of 
form and wholes: science is a matter of deriving the particular 
from the general rather than vice versa. The whole constitutes 
the fundamental reality. This is not only the case with the uni-
verse conceived as a whole through its implicate order; it is also 
the case with any creature whose unity constitutes its parts that 
are intrinsically related to one another in the sense that a change 
to one affects the others.
CONCLUSION
The Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of nature and natural 
philosophical inquiry with which we began conceived of for-
mal and final causes as the metaphysical basis on which nature is 
intelligible. This treated nature as an organism in the sense that 
parts are intrinsically related to one another through form—the 
“what it is to be” something. At the same time, the form is the fi-
nal cause that structures agency in nature. The teleological order 
is neither exclusively intrinsic nor extrinsic. It is in this overarch-
ing context—the priority of act over potency in the order of be-
ing and explanation—that matter as a potentiality is understood. 
Final causes are only intelligible, however, against the horizon of 
an ultimate finality that is desirable in itself and for no other goal. 
This can be conceived as the ultimate good which is convertible 
with being itself, namely God. Nature as a whole is understood 
in relation to that which is supremely One.
The advent of early modern physics in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries saw a very different conception of mat-
50. Ibid., 226–27.
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ter and nature. Mechanistic cosmology did not abandon final 
causes altogether, but construed teleology in entirely extrinsic 
terms as derived from the inscrutable will of God. Likewise, the 
relation of matter was extrinsic; wholes, including the whole of 
nature itself, were construed on the basis of fundamental particles 
known as corpuscles. This made a reductive physics a priority. 
Nevertheless, this mechanistic ontology came at a price: first, 
the unintelligibility of life and its inevitable reduction to dead 
matter that could not account for agency; second, the increas-
ingly problematic status of matter, which was nevertheless ac-
companied by the conviction that matter either exhausts reality 
or stands incomprehensively over and against an alternate reality 
known as mind or spirit.
Despite the stubborn persistence of materialism as a 
metaphysical thesis and the widespread assumption of mecha-
nistic cosmology in the common imagination, the twentieth-
century revolution in physics has turned from mechanism toward 
a more organic and dynamic understanding of matter and na-
ture. Nevertheless, the interpretation of quantum mechanics and 
quantum theory remains highly contested. The conception of 
matter in contemporary physics, which emphasizes gravitational 
and electromagnetic fields as well as an array of subatomic parti-
cles, remains ambiguous. Nevertheless, the findings of quantum 
physics suggest a renewed sense of the wholeness of nature as the 
very basis of natural scientific inquiry.
The implicate order described by David Bohm as an in-
terpretation of quantum phenomena, particularly entanglement, 
strongly suggests the wholeness of nature and the renewal of an 
organic conception of the universe.51 At the same time, the un-
derstanding of the relation of parts to the whole in the impli-
cate order pertains to creatures and is reminiscent of Aristotelian 
51. The renewed interest in the unities that ground our understanding 
of particulars, especially matter, is notable in the philosophy of emergence 
and powers metaphysics. This is particularly the case in the philosophy of 
mind. While there is much promise in these fields, the extent to which the 
understanding of the emergent properties of matter remains committed to an 
underlying materialism and nominalism suggests clear differences to the Aris-
totelian and Thomistic view of form and finality. For an excellent critical dis-
cussion within an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework, see Mariusz Tabaczek, 
Emergence: Towards a New Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2019).
PHYSICS WITHOUT PHYSIS 469
forms: in both formula and substance, the whole is prior to the 
parts. In turn, this implies an intrinsic teleology—an orienta-
tion toward the good or actualization of the whole—grounded 
in the forms of creatures as a dynamic substantial unity. Bohm 
also describes an explicate order, and it is here that he identifies 
the subject matter of physics. While physics and the natural sci-
ences begin with the implicate wholeness of nature—this being 
the very ground of the possibility for any intelligible science at 
all—they work by abstraction of particulars within that implicate 
order. Those particulars, which are understood as related to each 
other via an explicate or extrinsic order, are abstracted from the 
unity of nature itself. This means that physics rightly deals with 
abstractions and is therefore, in itself, incomplete.52 It must be 
grounded in the generality of metaphysics, which treats the unity 
of being qua being. This is the context in which matter must be 
understood: not as a potentiality grounding the rest of nature 
(despite the statistical and probabilistic nature of the quantum 
domain), but a potentiality that is always grounded in the prior 
actuality of nature’s metaphysical unity that is both formal and 
final. Nevertheless, as was seen above with respect to Aristotle 
and Aquinas, that unity is only finally intelligible in participative 
relation to that which is One in itself and therefore the final end 
of all things.                                                                                                                             
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